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Photographs are usually considered mere illustrations of
testimony and may be authenticated by a witness, familiar with
the scene, who vouches for their accuracy.' In State v. Campbell,'
because a policeman testified that the photographs offered were
correct representations of the area portrayed, it was not necessary
that the photographer himself be present for cross-examination.
The court also held that, even after substantial descriptive
testimony, photographs of the scene of a homicide may be admit-
ted at the discretion of the trial judge.' Dicta in a 1959 case,4
indicating that photographs are not to be admitted unless "neces-
sary to show material facts or conditions," has probably been
responsible for many appeals in recent years. An interest in allow-
ing trial judges to function with a minimum number of rules has
prevailed, however, for it appears that lower court rulings will not
be disturbed short of admitting pictures of ghastly wounds in the
absence of some necessity. Thus it has been held that receipt in
evidence of a gruesome picture of a decomposed body was not an
abuse of discretion where the trial judge believed it necessary for
identification by witnesses.5 But, when the circumstances do not
necessitate admittance, receipt in evidence of a photograph show-
ing the battered body of the deceased is reversible error.'
Campbell thus follows the traditional rule that determinations of
materiality and relevance are left to the discretion of the trial
court.
The court states its rule regarding photographs as follows: "If
such photographs are calculated to arouse the sympathy or preju-
dice of the jury or if they are entirely irrelevant or not necessary
1. See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 214 (1972) (hereinafter cited as
McCoRnm); 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 790 (Chadboum rev. 1970) (hereinafter cited as
WIGNIORE).
2. 259 S.C. 339, 191 S.E.2d 770 (1972).
3. Id.; accord, State v. Jones, 228 S.C. 484, 91 S.E.2d 1 (1956).
4. Peagler v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 234 S.C. 140, 162, 107 S.E.2d 15, 27 (1959).
5. State v. Edwards, 194 S.C. 410, 10 S.E.2d 587 (1940) (3-2 decision).
6. State v. Waitus, 224 S.C. 12, 77 S.E.2d 256 (1953).
1
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to substantiate facts, they should be excluded."7 As applied, the
test requires an unacceptable purpose of the proponent, immater-
iality of the photograph, or perhaps both.'
B. Evidence of Other Crimes
In State v. Miller9 evidence of another crime, the physical
abuse of victims during the course of a robbery, was held admissi-
ble at defendant's trial for armed robbery. The court reasoned
that the beatings were "part and parcel" of the robbery and thus
reaffirmed South Carolina's common scheme exception to the
general rule that evidence of an accused's other crimes is inad-
missible.1"
C. Evidence of Remarriage in Wrongful Death Actions
In Smith v. Wells" the trial court permitted defendant to
prove that plaintiff had remarried within six months of her hus-
band's death. Defendant argued that because of South Carolina's
unique wrongful death statute12 such evidence should be admissi-
ble to avoid maximizing plaintiff's speculative damages for grief
and sorrow, loss of companionship, and deprivation of society.
The court held evidence of remarriage to be inadmissible against
either the surviving spouse or children because its introduction
would necessitate an inquiry into the relative merits of the two
husbands, including a comparison of their prospective earnings,
contributions, services, society and companionship.
Although several jurisdictions allow this evidence, the ma-
jority do not. 4 Exclusion is rationalized by noting that damages
7. 259 S.C. at 344, 191 S.E.2d at 773, quoting State v. Thorne, 239 S.C. 164, 167, 121
S.E.2d 623, 624 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 979 (1962).
8. 259 S.C. at 344, 191 S.E.2d at 773.
9. 193 S.E.2d 802 (S.C. 1972).
10. E.g., State v. Gamble, 247 S.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 709 (1966), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
927 (1968); State v. Sharpe, 239 S.C. 258, 122 S.E.2d 622 (1961).
11. 258 S.C. 316, 188 S.E.2d 470 (1972).
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1954 (1962). The statute allows recovery for: 1) pecuniary
loss; 2) mental shock and suffering; 3) wounded feelings; 4) grief and sorrow; 5) loss of
companionship; and 6) deprivation of the use and comfort of the deceased's society,
experience, knowledge and judgment. Mishoe v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 186 S.C. 402, 419, 197
S.E. 97, 104 (1938).
13. E.g., Campbell v. Schmidt, 195 So. 2d 87 (Miss. 1967); Jensen v. Heritage Mut.
Ins. Co., 23 Wis. 2d 344, 127 N.W.2d 228 (1964); Plant v. Simmons Co., 321 F. Supp. 735,
741 (D. Md. 1970).
14. See generally Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 252 (1963).
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arise at the time of the spouse's death and that subsequent ac-
tions of the surviving spouse should not benefit the wrongdoer.
The principal case is also consonant with South Carolina's collat-
eral source rule, which states that compensation received for an
injury from a source wholly independent of the wrongdoer does
not offset damages recoverable from the wrongdoer.' 5
II. JUDICIAL NOTICE
Benford v. Berkeley Heating Co." was a products liability
action brought by a homeowner whose house was destroyed in a
fire caused by his furnace. Plaintiff joined the manufacturer,
Trane, and the dealer, Berkeley, electing breach of warranty as
his theory. The jury absolved Berkeley of liability, although the
evidence showed that it had made three major errors in installing
the furnace, including failure to provide sufficient clearance be-
tween the draft hood and pine joists as required by the manufac-
turer's manual. Manufacturer, however, was held liable on the
basis of expert testimony that a defective blower switch could
have caused the fire even if the furnace had been installed with
the recommended clearance. 7 In granting manufacturer's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the South Carolina
court concluded that judicial notice may be taken of "the laws of
physics and mathematics, together with generally accepted facts
relating to natural forces."' 8
Plaintiff's expert had testified that the two or three inch
difference in clearance was insignificant and not measurable. To
discredit this testimony the court noticed that "the net energy
radiated between the hot draft hood and cooler joist would vary
with the distance between them in proportion to a variable factor
"" and held that dealer's negligent installation was an
unforeseeable intervening cause. This use of judicial notice indi-
cates acceptance of the view that evidence contradicting the truth
15. Young v. Warr, 252 S.C. 179, 165 S.E.2d 797 (1969); Powers v. Temple, 250 S.C.
149, 156 S.E.2d 759 (1967).
16. 258 S.C. 357, 188 S.E.2d 841 (1972).
17. Trane's manual called for at least 6" clearance from combustible material; Berke-
ley installed with only a 2 3/4" clearance from the pine joists.
18. 258 S.C. at 367n.5, 188 S.E.2d at 845n.5, citing 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 74 (1964);
cf. Johnson v. Atlantic C.L. Ry., 112 S.C. 47, 99 S.E. 755 (1919).
19. 258 S.C. at 367n.5, 188 S.E.2d at 845n.5, citing M. JAcoBs, ELEMENTS OF HEAT
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of a noticed fact is inadmissible because, by its nature, a fact that
may be judicially noticed is an indisputable fact which the jury
must be instructed to accept as true.
21
In support of the fact noticed, the court cited a learned trea-
tise on heat transfer.2 There is some question whether defendant
manufacturer could have introduced the treatise to impeach
plaintiff's expert. A 1931 case 22 holds that reading of medical or
scientific works in court is precluded by statute,23 except when the
question is one of insanity or the administration of poison. "The
restriction of their use to such cases is irrefutable argument that
they cannot be used in any other cases. ' 24 In 1937, however, the
court authorized the admission of medical articles and reports to
impeach the witness who had previously prepared them,25 com-
menting that the only legitimate reason for prohibiting the use of
learned treatises is that such use introduces the statement of a
person not subject to cross-examination. The witness was thus
bound by his own published, prior inconsistent statements be-
cause he was subject to cross-examination.
The strict prior inconsistent statement notion would not ex-
tend to include the use of scientific books authored by others. It
could be argued, however, that the learned treatise statute is to
be treated as merely a special hearsay rule. Thus, the book on
heat transfer might be read in court during cross-examination,
not for its substantive value, but rather to impeach the expert
witness.2 1 Concern about allowing a "battle of the books" should
be minimal in the cross-examination setting, and the point seems
worth arguing.
20. MCCORMICK § 332, at 769, citing Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARv. L. REv. 269
(1944). Another view is that the function of notice is merely to expedite trials, so that
contradictory evidence is admissible, and the jury is free to accept or reject the fact
noticed. 9 WIGMORE § 2567a.
21. M. JACOBS, ELEMENTS OF HEAT TRANSFER 221 (3d ed. 1957).
22. Baker v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 161 S.C. 479, 159 S.E. 822 (1931).
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-142 (1962): "In all actions in which the question of sanity
or. . .the administration of poison or any other article destructive to life is involved and
in which expert testimony may be introduced, medical or scientific works . . . shall be
competent and admissible to be read before the court or jury . .. ."
24. Baker v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 161 S.C. 479, 483, 159 S.E. 822, 823 (1931).
25. LaCount v. General Asbestos and Rubber Co., 184 S.C. 232, 192 S.E. 262 (1937).
26. See generally J. DREHER, A GUIDE TO EvDENCE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA 11 (1967)
(hereinafter cited as DREHER).
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III. EXPERT TESTIMONY
The court in Benford was also faced with discrediting testi-
mony that the joist would eventually have ignited at a distance
of six inches. The expert's conclusion was held to be without
probative value on this crucial issue because it was not made in
response to a hypothetical question and the facts underlying the
opinion were not stated. The court reasoned that the opinion may
have rested on the assumption that one of the installation errors
was present, and further noted that the expert gave no estimate
of how much additional time would have been necessary for igni-
tion.
The court has never stated the rule regarding expert opinion
quite so strictly. The hypothetical question is, of course, required
when an expert is not testifying about facts within his personal
knowledge. 7 When the expert has personal knowledge of the
facts, he is generally required to first state the facts upon which
his opinion is based, unless those facts cannot be effectively re-
produced in language.28 In South Carolina Highway Department
v. Bryant,"5 however, the court looked to the expert's testimony
as a whole to determine the facts upon which his conclusion
rested. And it has traditionally been held that, once admitted,
expert testimony capable of more than one reasonable inference
should be afforded whatever weight the jury wishes A A comment
by the court in Benford that the opinion could have rested on the
assumption that one of the installation errors contributed to the
fire makes it clear that more than one reasonable inference was
possible from the testimony. Thus, to reach the court's result, it
was necessary to hold the expert's opinion to be without probative
value.3'
27. State v. King, 158 S.C. 251, 286, 155 S.E. 409, 422 (1930); Easler v. Southern Ry.,
59 S.C. 311, 37 S.E. 938 (1901). See generally 7 WIGMORE § 1927.
28. Smith v. Smith, 194 S.C. 247, 9 S.E.2d 584 (1940) (testimony about humiliation
and damage to reputation). Under rule 705 of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, it
is not necessary to disclose the underlying facts unless required to do so by the judge or
opposing counsel.
29. 253 S.C. 400, 171 S.E.2d 349 (1969).
30. Poston v. Southeastern Constr. Co., 208 S.C. 35, 36 S.E.2d 858 (1946); Smith v.
Southern Builders, 202 S.C. 88, 24 S.E.2d 109 (1943); Anderson v. Campbell Tile Co., 202
S.C. 54, 24 S.E.2d 104 (1943).
31. Benford is probably best explained as a "hard case" resulting from the question-
able verdict. Indeed, the court concluded as follows: "We find the record devoid of any
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The case also seems to limit Greer v. Greenville County32 in
which the court held that if a timely objection is not made to a
defective hypothetical question, the objection is waived and the
answer retains probative force. The court there reasoned that,
since opposing counsel could have cross-examined to show that
consideration of all facts would have changed the expert opinion,
the evidence was properly admitted; once admitted it was to be
considered and weighed by the jury." The expert's answer is not




It is difficult to reconcile the Greer conclusion, that the an-
swer to a deficient hypothetical question should be weighed by
the jury, with the Benford holding, that an opinion has no proba-
tive value whatsoever in the absence of a statement of the under-
lying facts. Greer is distinguishable because some underlying
facts were expressed there, but its rationale seems to have been
seriously eroded. In Benford there was no objection to the opin-
ion, and opposing counsel had at least one opportunity to cross-
examine.
In Oglesby v. Smith3 none of three medical experts would
testify that deceased's injury was "most probably" caused by the
accident in question. Other facts showed, however, that his condi-
tion had deteriorated seriously within five days of the accident
and that no signs of the other alleged cause had been noticed. The
court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding of
causation because the testimony of the medical experts was not
solely relied upon to support that conclusion. 6 In the absence of
other corroborating evidence, however, it remains necessary that
the experts testify that the disability or death "most probably"
resulted from the accidental injury. 37
Defendant argued on appeal that the unanimous opinion of
occurred in natural course, absent faulty installation by the defendant Berkeley." 258 S.C.
at 368, 188 S.E.2d at 846. Thus it might be expected that the court will not strictly adhere
to its new rule.
32. 245 S.C. 442, 141 S.E.2d "91 (1965) (seven alleged deficiencies in hypothetical
question).
33. Cf. Chapman v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 249 S.C. 438, 154 S.E.2d 845 (1967)
(substantially all material facts included in hypothetical question).
34. 245 S.C. at 458, 141 S.E.2d at 99, quoting 88 C.J.S. Trial § 155, at 303 (1955).
35. 258 S.C. 392, 188 S.E.2d 856 (1972).
36. Accord, Grice v. Dickerson, Inc., 241 S.C. 225, 127 S.E.2d 722 (1962).
37. Cross v. Concrete Materials, 236 S.C. 440, 114 S.E.2d 828 (1960).
1973]
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the medical experts that causation was possible but not probable
was dispositive of the case. It was suggested that where the ques-
tion is one for experts alone and concerns a matter of science,
specialized art, or other matters of which laymen can have no
knowledge, expert opinion may be conclusive.38 There is language
to this effect in the reports, but it appears to be only dicta ema-
nating from a 1943 decision39 that has never been actually ap-
plied.
IV. DOCUMENTS
A. Authentication of Writing Introduced to Impeach
In State v. Miller"0 the prosecution, without specifying a pur-
pose, introduced a note received by the defendant's alleged ac-
complice, Davis. The note instructed Davis to include in his con-
fession a statement exculpating defendant Miller. Davis first tes-
tified that the defendant had sent the note, but later testified
that he did not know who had sent it. The court reversed Miller's
conviction, holding that the writing should have been excluded
at trial because it had not been authenticated. The accomplice
had repudiated his knowledge of the note's source, and no other
evidence established the identity of the sender. The implied
subornation obviously prejudiced defendant, and apparently no
curative instructions were given.
It is difficult to ascertain the precise holding of the case.
Justice Littlejohn's dissent makes it clear that the majority re-
jected the notion that unauthenticated documents may be re-
ceived to impeach, at least where that purpose is not specified.
The dissent reasoned that the writing was properly admitted to
show that the accomplice had changed his testimony and that the
change was motivated by the note.4' This reasoning follows Wig-
more's statement that "[wihen the execution of a document is
38. Brief for Appellant at 11, Oglesby v. Smith, 258 S.C. 392, 188 S.E.2d 856 (1972).
39. Anderson v. Campbell Tile Co., 202 S.C. 54, 63, 24 S.E.2d 104, 107-08 (1943),
quoting 32 CJ.S. Evidence § 569(c), at 607 (1964). See, e.g., Polk v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours Co., 250 S.C. 468, 475, 158 S.E.2d 765, 768 (1968); Dennis v. Williams Furniture
Corp., 243 S.C. 53, 60, 132 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1963). For a discussion of South Carolina cases
regarding contradictory medical and lay testimony, see Hines v. Pacific Mills, 214 S.C.
125, 51 S.E.2d 383 (1949).
40. 193 S.E.2d 802 (S.C. 1972).
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not in issue, but only the contents or the fact of the existence of
a document of such a tenor, no authentication is necessary. "42
Because the majority did not specifically consider the distinction
regarding use of the writing for impeachment, the case may be
read to exclude any use where the source is not proved. On the
other hand, the case could be narrowly applied to only those
situations in which no purpose for introduction is specified and
no limiting instructions are given to the jury.
B. Best Evidence Rule
South Carolina generally applies the best evidence rule as
stated by McCormick: "In proving the terms of a writing, where
the terms are material, the original writing must be produced
unless it is shown to be unavailable for some reason other than
the serious fault of the proponent.
4 3
In State v. Miller" the prosecution sought to prove that the
defendant had spent four twenty-dollar bills which bore the serial
numbers of bills taken in a robbery. The bills spent by Miller had
disappeared from a locker at police headquarters and could not
be produced at the trial. When the unavailability of the bills was
discovered, counsel for the defendant moved to strike all evidence
about the bills and their serial numbers as hearsay. On appeal the
evidence was challenged on the basis of the best evidence rule.
The court was not required to decide the question but did advise
the trial court (on remand) that the best evidence rule does not
bar such testimony, stating: "[Tihe evidence related to the
identity of the bills and not to their contents as written instru-
ments, and the bills had apparently been stolen and were not
available at trial. '
45
There is authority in South Carolina for the proposition that
the best evidence rule applies only if the terms of the writings are
42. 7 WIGMORE § 2132. See People v. Marsh, 58 Cal. 2d 732, 376 P.2d 300, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 300 (1962) (statement admissible to show defendant relied upon it); State v. Wald-
rop, 73 S.C. 60, 52 S.E. 793 (1905) (contract not offered to prove contents but rather that
lease existed).
43. MCCORMICK § 230; DREHER at 49. See Vaught v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 250
S.C. 65, 156 S.E.2d 627 (1967); Sims v. Jones, 43 S.C. 91, 20 S.E. 905 (1895).
44. 193 S.E.2d 802 (S.C. 1972).
45. Id. at 804.
1973]
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in issue" so that testimony about identity is not barred by the
rule." According to Wigmore,
The fundamental notion of the rule requiring production is that
in writings the smallest variation in words may be of import-
ance, and that such errors in regard to words and phrases are
more likely to occur than errors in regard to other features of a
physical thing. Thus the rule applies only to the terms of the
document, and not to any other facts about the document.48
Determining when to make this distinction is difficult;" and con-
cern about the likelihood of small variation could extend to re-
membered serial numbers. But since the bills in Miller had been
impounded the possibility of mistake seems minimal. Just as the
witness would have been allowed to testify that he received re-
portedly stolen bills, it is not unreasonable to allow him to testify
about the serial numbers. Of course, even if the rule did apply,
the testimony is admissible as secondary evidence. Because the
rule is aimed at securing the best obtainable evidence of a docu-
ment's contents, other evidence should be admissible where the
original cannot be produced as a result of loss or destruction
through no serious fault of the proponent."
V. CONFESSIONS
The United States Supreme Court recently held in Lego v.
Twomey5' that state courts are free to require that the voluntari-
ness of confessions be established either by a preponderance of
the evidence or by proof beyond a reasonable doubt in Jackson
v. Denno2 hearings before trial judges:
[When a confession challenged as involuntary is sought to be
used against a criminal defendant at his trial, he is entitled to
a reliable and clear-cut determination that the confession was
in fact voluntarily rendered. Thus the prosecution must prove
46. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. LaMunion, 245 S.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 337 (1964)
(terms); Sims v. Jones, 43 S.C. 91, 20 S.E. 905 (1895) (content).
47. United States v. Alexander, 326 F.2d 736, 742 (4th Cir. 1964).
48. 4 WIoMORE § 1242, at 574.
49. Id.
50. McCoRMICK § 237; Vaught v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 250 S.C. 65, 156 S.E.2d
627 (1967).
51. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
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at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession
was voluntary. 3
In two recent decisions, the South Carolina Supreme Court ap-
pears to have acknowledged that proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is necessary. 4 The cases arise out of two separate trials for murder
in which the circumstances surrounding one oral confession"5 to
both crimes were presented differently. Only the later decision
will be discussed for its facts make it the stronger of the two.
At his trial Andrew Bellue contended that because he was
under the influence of drugs at the time of his confession he was
mentally incompetent to give it voluntarily. 5 Two doctors testi-
fied that it was difficult to determine from what drugs, if any,
defendant was withdrawing, but it was their opinion that he was
in "sufficiently bad shape" to preclude his making a critical deci-
sion for some time.57 Two police officers with experience in drug
abuse cases testified that Bellue appeared alert, coherent and
normal at the time of his questioning." The trial judge admitted
the confession after finding "beyond a reasonable doubt that [it]
was voluntarily given.""
Noting that there was evidence reasonably supporting the
trial judge's factual findings, the supreme court held:
We affirm under the established rule that the determination by
the trial court of the preliminary facts upon which the admission
of evidence depends will not be disturbed on appeal "unless so
manifestly erroneous as to show an abuse of judicial discre-
tion."60
53. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972).
54. State v. Bellue, 194 S.E.2d 193 (S.C. 1973); State v. Bellue, 193 S.E.2d 121 (S.C.
1972). Cf. State v. Thomas, 248 S.C. 573, 583, 151 S.E.2d 855, 861 (1966): "Appellant's
plea of not guilty, of course, put upon the State the burden of proving every element of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." [1970] S.C. REP. ATT'y Gm. 35 (No. 2882) (high-
est degree of proof required to demonstrate that juvenile waived rights freely, compe-
tently, and knowingly). The Fourth Circuit also requires proof of voluntariness beyond a
reasonable doubt. Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 1970).
55. The detective in charge of the questioning testified that although statements were
generally reduced to writing he "didn't feel in this particular instance that it was neces-
sary." Record at 383, State v. Bellue, 194 S.E.2d 193 (S.C. 1973).
56. See generally Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199 (1960); see also Survey of Criminal Law and Procedure supra.
57. Record at 330-53, State v. Bellue, 194 S.E.2d 193 (S.C. 1972).
58. Id. at 353-63.
59. Id. at 365.
60. 194 S.E.2d at 194, citing State v. Bethea, 241 S.C. 16, 126 S.E.2d 846 (1962) and
State v. Henderson, 74 S.C. 477, 55 S.E. 117 (1906).
1973]
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The court does not cite Lego v. Twomey, nor does it expressly
address itself to the quantum of proof question. It does, however,
seem to be acknowledging the more exacting standard because it
chose not to disturb the conclusion of the trial judge over defen-
dant's specific contention that the evidence could not support a
finding of voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. It could be
argued that because the court did not mention the reasonable
doubt quantum it is prepared to use the preponderance test in the
future. Such a decision, however, would necessitate distinguish-
ing both the Bellue cases and State v. Thomas,' and the argu-
ment thus assumes that the court would go out of its way to
require less of the prosecution than it presently does.
VI. HEARSAY
Player v. Thompson62 involved an attempt to prove a driver's
recklessness and heedlessness in an action under South Carolina's
guest statute. 3 To show knowledge of defective tires, the plaintiff
offered a prior statement by the driver that she had heard a motor
vehicle inspector tell the owner that the car needed two new tires.
The trial court's exclusion of the statement as hearsay was re-
versed by the court which expressly accepted McCormick's defi-
nition:
Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence, of
a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as
an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and
thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out of court
asserter.'4
The prior statement should have been received not to prove that
the tires were slick, but to indicate that the driver had obtained
knowledge of their condition, the fact of slick tires having been
established by other evidence."
The court also rejected a determination by the trial court
that the admission should be excluded because the driver had no
61. 248 S.C. 573, 151 S.E.2d 855 (1966). See cases cited note 54 supra.
62. 193 S.E.2d 531 (S.C. 1972).
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-801 (1962).
64. MCCORMICK § 246, at 584.
65. 193 S.E.2d at 535. DREHER at 59 notes that the formal definition of hearsay has
been largely ignored in South Carolina except for two cases: Watson v. Wall, 239 S.C. 109,
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personal knowledge that the tires were slick. Citing Wigmore,66
the court stated that personal knowledge of the person making an
admission is immaterial. 7
State v. Miller" reaffirmed South Carolina's rule allowing
the introduction of prior inconsistent statements to impeach a
witness. 9
VII. THE DEAD MAN STATUTE
Hicks v. Battey" follows the announced policy of the court
to strictly construe the dead man statute.7' Plaintiff sustained
injuries when hit and knocked down by a boat trailer attached to
a vehicle driven by deceased. Deceased's executor asserted that
plaintiff was incompetent to testify, arguing that the accident
was a "transaction or communication" within the dead man stat-
ute.72 The court declined to hold the statute operative, stating:
[Transaction. . . means a carrying on or through of any mat-
ter or affair, and implies a mutuality; something done by both
in concert, in which both take some part.
The necessity that there be mutuality or concert of action to
constitute a transaction eliminates a fortuitous, involuntary act,
such as here involved.
73
66. 4 WIGMORE § 1053.
67. 193 S.E.2d at 535.
68. 193 S.E.2d 802 (S.C. 1972).
69. Elliott v. Black River Elec. Cooperative, 233 S.C. 233, 104 S.E.2d 357 (1958);
McMillan v. Ridges, 229 S.C. 76, 91 S.E.2d 883 (1956); State v. Williams, 222 S.C. 354,
72 S.E.2d 830 (1952). See generally McCoRMiICK § 34.
70. 192 S.E.2d 477 (S.C. 1972).
71. See, e.g., Havird v. Schissell, 252 S.C. 404, 166 S.E.2d 801 (1969); Lisenby v.
Newsom, 234 S.C. 237, 107 S.E.2d 449 (1959).
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-402 (1962) provides:
[N]o party to an action or proceeding. . . shall be examined in regard to any
transaction or communication between such witness and a person at the time
of such examination deceased. . . as a witness against a party then prosecuting
or defending the action as executor [or] administrator . . . of such deceased
person . . . when such examination or any judgment. . . can in any manner
affect the interest of such witness . . ..
For a general discussion of the statute, see Long v. Conroy, 246 S.C. 225, 143 S.E.2d 459
(1965).
73. 192 S.E.2d at 479, citing Burns v. Caughman, 255 S.C. 199, 202-03, 178 S.E.2d
151, 152 (1970); Jeffords v. Muldrow, 104 S.C. 388, 89 S.E. 357 (1916); Sullivan v. Latimer,
38 S.C. 158, 17 S.E. 701 (1893).
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol25/iss3/9
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
VIII. IN FAVOREM VITAE
In favorem vitae is the doctrine by which the court in capital
cases reviews on appeal exceptions not properly reserved below.74
The policy is employed only in cases in which the death penalty
has been ordered and is not applicable when the defendant could
have received the death penalty but did not.75 Since Furman v.
Georgia0 invalidated the imposition of the death penalty, the
South Carolina Supreme Court has treated death sentences as
convictions with recommendations of mercy, which generate
sentences of life imprisonment," and thus no longer relies upon
in favorem vitae.
78
IX. TECHNICALITIES: UNINTENTIONAL WAIVER OF OBJECTION BY
CROSS-EXAMINATION
State v. McKinney7 is reported as follows:
Malcolm McKinney, the appellant herein, was convicted in
the Spartanburg County Court of an assault of a high and aggra-
vated nature. During the course of the trial certain testimony
was admitted over the objection of his counsel. Thereafter,
counsel for the appellant cross-examined the witness thereabout
without reserving the objection previously made. The objection
was thereby lost and if any error had been committed in the
admission of the testimony it was cured. [Citations omitted.]
The only error alleged was the admission of the testimony
hereinbefore referred to. It is apparent under the cases above
cited that the exception posing this question is without merit.
The judgment below is, Affirmed.
The rule is one with which all South Carolina attorneys
should be familiar, but in recent years a surprising number of
appeals have been dismissed for unintentional waiver.80 In spite
74. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 248 S.C. 573, 151 S.E.2d 855 (1966).
75. State v. Anderson, 253 S.C. 168, 169 S.E.2d 706 (1969).
76. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
77, State v. Gibson, 192 S.E.2d 720 (S.C. 1972).
78. State v. Bellue, 193 S.E.2d 121 (S.C. 1972).
79. 258 S.C. 570, 190 S.E.2d 30 (1972). Accord, State v. Hall, 193 S.E.2d 269 (S.C.
1972).
80. E.g., State v. Hoffman, 257 S.C. 461, 186 S.E.2d 421 (1972); State v. Lee, 255
S.C. 309, 178 S.E.2d 652 (1971); State v. Harvey, 253 S.C. 328, 170 S.E.2d 657 (1969);
State v. Anderson, 253 S.C. 168, 169 S.E.2d 706 (1969); State v. Motley, 251 S.C. 568,
164 S.E,2d 569 (1968); State v. Sanders, 251 S.C. 431, 163 S.E.2d 220 (1968); State v.
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of the acceptance and frequent application of the rule, there is
precedent to the contrary that apparently has not been presented
to the court. A 1926 decision, Green v. Shaw,"1 which has never
been overruled or distinguished, seems to contradict the present
doctrine. There the court concluded:
Without making the testimony elicited the testimony of the
cross-examining party, cross-examination may serve a number
of useful purposes in the trial of a case, such as . . . testing the
credibility of the witness or combating the effect of the testi-
mony upon the minds of the jury. And we are unable to see why
a litigant who has duly objected to the admission of incompetent
testimony should be required to choose between foregoing the
opportunity to accomplish such legitimate purposes through
cross-examination of the testifying witness and waiving his right
of appeal based on the Court's error in admitting the testi-
mony 2
It does not appear that the cross-examining party in Green re-
quested that his objection be reserved, nor did the court require
such a reservation as it now does. Indeed, the court went on to
state:
When testimony has been admitted and an exception noted,
counsel may deem it necessary to cross-examine the witness on
the subject; and, if it is simply a cross-examination, he ought
not be deprived of his exception, provided the record shows he
does not intend thereby to waive it, and that ought to be inferred
when it is strictly cross-examination."
Cases holding that an objection is waived by cross-
examination originated shortly after Green and of course never
mentioned the earlier rule. 4 No justification has ever been offered
for the present rule; administrative convenience seems to be the
only explanation for its vitality.85 Thus Professor Dreher has criti-
cized the rule, stating:
81. 136 S.C. 56, 134 S.E. 226 (1926). See also Horres v. Berkely Chem. Co., 57 S.C.
189, 35 S.E. 500 (1900).
82. 136 S.C. at 65, 134 S.E. at 228. The court also noted that its holding was not in
conflict with any prior decision.
83. Id. at 68, 134 S.E. at 229, quoting United Rys. & Elec. Co. v. Corbin, 109 Md.
442, 455, 72 A. 606, 610 (1909).
84. E.g., Snipes v. Augusta-Aiken Ry. & Elec. Corp., 151 S.C. 391,149 S.E. 111 (1929)
(citing no authority).
85. Cf. State v. Burnett, 226 S.C. 421, 85 S.E.2d 744 (1954).
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It is completely illogical to think that a cross-examining lawyer
is intentionally waiving an objection which he insisted upon a
few minutes earlier, but [the requirement of a specific reserva-
tion of objection] is settled South Carolina law . . .. This
would seem to be a pure technicality and important enough to
change. 6
MICHAEL J. GIESE
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